By Jim Parke |
A programme to improve public health might fund clinics, train staff and distribute medicines. Each project could finish on time, yet the intended health improvement might remain out of reach. Transport may prevent patients attending appointments. A funding rule may reward the number of consultations rather than continuing care. A shortage of local workers may make the new facilities difficult to operate.
This is a systems problem. The result depends on relationships among services, incentives, people and institutions, as well as on the quality of each individual project. Systems thinking gives programme leaders a way to examine those relationships before they make further commitments. It is particularly valuable when the desired outcome is social change rather than delivery of a single asset.
Start with the outcome, then draw the boundary
A project has a defined scope. A social programme needs a boundary too, but drawing it too tightly can hide the causes of the problem. Suppose a programme is intended to increase school attendance. Building classrooms may be necessary. It may have little effect if children cannot travel safely, households rely on children's earnings or the available teachers are leaving the region.
The first task is to name the outcome and ask what produces it. Who influences it? Which conditions lie outside the programme manager’s direct control? What changes elsewhere if the programme succeeds? These questions do not require an impossibly complete map of society. They require a useful map of the relationships that could change the investment decision.
The boundary should be revisited as evidence emerges. If a programme repeatedly misses its outcome despite meeting its delivery targets, its leaders may be measuring the wrong part of the system. Adding more of the same output is then a poor substitute for examining what happens after people encounter it.
Look for feedback, including the feedback that arrives late
Programme plans often describe a sequence: invest, deliver, benefit. Real systems respond to an intervention. Those responses may reinforce progress or limit it.
For example, easier access to a service may increase demand. Higher demand can overwhelm staff and lengthen waiting times; those waits may then deter people from using the service. This is a balancing loop, in which the response checks the initial increase. Conversely, improved access may build trust, encourage earlier help-seeking and produce better experiences that strengthen trust further. That is a reinforcing loop. The first signs of either response may appear well after a short-term capacity increase looks successful.
These are feedback loops: changes in one part of a system alter the conditions that generated them. A leader does not need an elaborate simulation to begin using the idea. Sketch the main relationships and ask: What will people do differently? What will become scarce? What result will we see first, and which result will take years? What indicator would tell us that the intervention is producing an unintended response?
Time delays matter. An education, health or climate programme may incur costs immediately while benefits develop over many years. If reviews focus only on near-term outputs, leaders can stop a useful intervention too early or continue an ineffective one for too long. Measures should include both early signals of change and the eventual outcome, with a clear explanation of the time between them.
Find the point of intervention that changes behaviour
When progress is slow, the instinct is often to add resources to the most visible activity. More funding or additional projects may help. Sometimes the stronger intervention changes the rules, information or incentives under which existing participants act.
Systems scientist Donella Meadows’ ranking of leverage points draws attention to these features of a system. She placed adjustments to parameters such as subsidies and taxes near the bottom of her list, while changes to information flows and system rules, including incentives, ranked much higher. The ranking is a prompt to investigate, not a promise that every rule change will work. An organisation seeking better coordination, for example, might fund another reporting platform. If agencies receive no benefit from sharing information, the platform may see little use. Changing decision rights, data-sharing rules or the incentives attached to collaboration could matter more than building another tool.
The search for a leverage point should remain empirical. A seemingly elegant intervention can fail if it assumes people have authority or capacity they do not possess. Test the proposed change with those who operate the system, identify who bears its costs and observe the response. Small pilots can be valuable where they reveal behaviour that a planning workshop would not.
Manage the trade-offs openly
The United Nations’ 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets, adopted as part of the 2030 Agenda in 2015, illustrate the scale of the interdependencies. Health, education, poverty reduction and climate action cannot simply be assigned to separate workstreams and added up. An intervention that advances one objective may rely on progress in another or impose costs elsewhere.
Interdependence does not mean every goal reinforces every other goal. New infrastructure may improve access while displacing residents. A rapid transition in one sector may place demands on a workforce, supply chain or community that has limited capacity to adapt.
The practical question is not whether all trade-offs can be eliminated. It is whether leaders identify the material ones early enough to make choices. Who receives the benefit? Who carries the cost, and when? Are those groups represented in the decision? Could a different design preserve most of the benefit with less harm?
This calls for more than a stakeholder list. People closest to the consequences may understand connections that are invisible in an organisation chart. Their participation should influence the options, not merely provide feedback after a preferred solution has hardened.
Design the handover before the programme ends
Large social programmes often rely on temporary funding and temporary teams. The outcome they seek must continue after those arrangements end. A new service may need a permanent budget, trained staff, maintenance, local decision-making authority and an institution willing to own its results.
Programme leaders should therefore ask at formation what the operating system will look like at close-out. Which organisation will take responsibility? What capabilities and local decision-making authority must it build during delivery? What information must it retain to learn from the intervention? A successful handover is not simply the transfer of an asset or a final report; it is the continuation of the relationships and capabilities that make the benefit possible. The question of who owns those benefits also arises at approval, as discussed in Five questions before approving a major project.
Systems thinking does not make complex change predictable. It does make hidden assumptions easier to challenge. Return to the opening health programme: the clinics are built, the staff trained and the medicines delivered, yet the health outcome remains out of reach. The next question is not simply which project to add. It is which relationship, rule or missing capability prevents those projects from working together for the people they were meant to serve.
Further reading
- United Nations, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda
- Donella Meadows, Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System: https://donellameadows.org/archives/leverage-points-places-to-intervene-in-a-system/